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The Three Worlds of AGI 
Popper’s Theory of the Three Worlds Applied to Artificial General Intelligence
Marta Ziosi 
Abstract This Capstone applies Popper’s Three-worlds 
paradigm to the academic discourse on Artificial General 
Intelligence (AGI). It intends to assess how this paradigm can be 
used to frame the opinions of scientists and philosophers on 
Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and what it reveals about 
the way the topic of AGI is approached from the fields of the 
Sciences and the Humanities. This has been achieved by means 
of a Literature Review reporting the opinions of main 
philosophers and scientists and by analysing two main projects – 
project CYC and project SOAR- advanced as possible ways to 
achieve AGI. As a result, most academics from the field of 
Science seem to better fit views on AGI interpreted through the 
lens of Popper’s World 2, the world of the mind. On the 
contrary, most philosophers seem to better fit views on AGI 
interpreted through the lens of Popper’s world 3, the world of the 
products of the human mind such as theories, knowledge and 
ideas. As a suggestion, this Thesis advocates the promotion of 




Back in 1965 the US psychologist Herbert Simon 
proclaimed that machines will be capable within 20 years to do 
any work a man can do (Simon, 1965). Nevertheless, the present 
state of affairs showcases how the promise has not withheld its 
foretelling. Why? It is a matter of timing? Or is it an illusionary 
idea which can avail itself solely of these empty ’20 to 30-years’ 
futurist prognoses? Opinions largely differ and many a times 
collide within people from different levels of expertise and 
belonging to different fields of research. Different opinions can 
be gathered from branches of Computer Science to Philosophy, 
from the Cognitive Sciences to Technology and Media Studies; 
more generally, from the fields of the Sciences to the ones of the 
Humanities.   
Arguably, the question ought not to be of an ‘all or 
nothing’ nature but one about the approach we as humans should 
take towards General Intelligence. Plainly, the past years have 
witnessed an incredible confluence of storage of big data, 
probabilistic programming and sheer increase in computing 
power. However, computers are still not capable of engaging in 
some apparently easy tasks for humans. The approach should be 
in thinking about robots and AGIs – Artificial Intelligent Agents 
- not just as a technology which engages in physical and 
computational work. The key relies in thinking about them 
indeed as physical computational entities but in relation to 
humans1. Several researchers are already engaging with such an 
approach. The main questions which are being asked are of the 
kind, ‘How can we and What does it mean to create an AGI 
which thinks?’ or ‘What does it mean to create an AGI with a 
common sense of human society, knowledge and culture?’.  
I hypothesize that while researchers in the field of 
science tend to work on the first question, the ones in the 
humanities tend to focus on the latter. However, any potential 
answer to both questions fundamentally requires both 
computational capabilities or understanding of algorithms from 
the sciences and critical thinking or the heuristics of the 
humanities. Thus, if the intent is to reach a generally intelligent 
agent, the efforts ought to hail from an as encompassing as 
possible interdisciplinary background. To achieve that, we ought 
to agree on the question to ask. This is essential in order to avoid 
the carry-out of miscommunication under the illusion of 
disagreement. 
This research will thus propose a framework to swiftly 
cut through the two different approaches in order to identify their 
differences in topic and purpose. The core-framework will be 
provided by Popper’s theory of the Three Worlds. The question 
which instructs this Capstone is ‘How can Popper’s Three-
worlds paradigm be applied to frame the opinions of scientists 
and philosophers on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and 
what does it reveal about the way the topic of AGI is 
approached?’. The core information on the topic of AGI will be 
proffered by means of exposing the main ideas and opinions 
over AGI of mainly scientists and philosophers. Conceivably, a 
thorough analysis of these will be conducted by applying the 
chosen framework. The last word is left to the conclusion where 
a suggestion on how to deal with discrepancies in opinions will 
be advanced. 
Finally, it is important to state that this thesis does not aim at 
predicting future scenarios and it aligns itself with Popper’s 
claim that predicting technological innovation is impossible 
(Popper, 1979). Indeed, if humans could, they would already 
know how to implement it, thus leaving no logical space 
between the prediction and the realization of the technology. The 
intended relevance of this thesis is principally to provide a 
broader outlook on matters of AGI and it aims at breaching 
through the AGI discourse by Popper’s toolbox of World 2 and 
World 3 in order to expose a potential thought-gap or 
                                                 
1 I am aware and I will not deny the importance of the physical 
part of the process of computation. This sentence is solely aimed 
at emphasising the importance of thinking about this ‘physical 
part’ in relation to human capabilities, given that the goal is 
Artificial General Intelligence. 
discrepancy of opinions between two chief-fields. A suggestion 
in favour of interdisciplinarity will be advanced at the end.  
2 DEFINITIONS 
 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
2a. Intelligence 
To begin with, it is important to define the term ‘intelligence’ in 
the way in which it will be used in the paper. Intelligence is the 
‘computational part of the ability to achieve goals in the world’ 
(Stanford, 2017). There are varying kinds and degrees of 
intelligence which occur in people, in many animals and some 
machines. As it has not yet been decided which computational 
procedures ought to be called ‘intelligent’, it is also extremely 
difficult to frame a solid definition of intelligence which 
detaches itself from any reference to human intelligence as that 
is the only example at present. Thus, this definition ought not to 
be dogmatic throughout the Thesis but it mostly serves as a 
guideline.  
2b. Artificial Intelligence 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is ‘the science and engineering of 
making intelligent machines’ (Stanford, 2017). AI does not 
necessarily limit itself to biologically observable methods. 
Indeed, even though brain emulation2 is an example of AI, there 
are several other approaches to AI such as ones working through 
probability or brute force algorithms (Goertzel, 2007).  
ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE 
(AGI) 
2c. General Intelligence 
General Intelligence is the ability to achieve complex goals in 
complex environments (Goertzel, 2007). The plurality of the 
words ‘goals’ and ‘environments’ is crucial to explain how a 
single goal or a single environment would not account for the 
word ‘general’. Indeed, a chess-playing program is not to be 
considered ‘generally’ intelligent as it can only carry-out one 
specific task. An agent possessing artificial intelligence ought to 
have the ability to carry-out a variety of tasks in diverse 
contexts, generalize from these contexts and to construct an 
understanding of itself and the world which is independent of 
context and specific tasks.  
                                                 
2 The process of copying the brain of an individual, scanning its 
structure in nanoscopic detail, replicating its physical behaviour 
in an artificial substrate, and embodying the result in a humanoid 
form (aeon). 
2d. AGI 
A complete appreciation of the challenges encountered by the 
idea of ‘general intelligence’ in the field of AI requires a wide 
range of perspectives to be adopted. Correspondently, Artificial 
General Intelligence (AGI) is a highly interdisciplinary field. As 
it follows from the definition of AI, it could be said that AGI is 
‘the science and engineering of making generally intelligent 
machines’. As it follows from the definition of General 
Intelligence, AGIs are expected to solve a wide range of 
complex problems in several contexts. Additionally, they learn 
to solve problems whose solution was not presented to them as 
the stage of their creation. Currently, there are no existing 
examples of AGIs in the real world.  
3. STATE OF AFFAIRS IN AI  
The present section will acquaint the reader with a brief 
background on the history of AI and AGI (first sub-section), the 
approaches to AGI (second sub-section) and finally, projects and 
possible solutions (third sub-section).  
3a. A bit of history of AI and AGI 
In 1956, after the first programmable computer was invented, the 
genesis of a new field called ‘Artificial Intelligence’ was 
announced at a conference at Dartmouth College in New 
Hampshire (Brey, 2001). This field had the ambition to supply 
computers – by means of programming - with some sort of 
intelligence. Even before that, the scientist Vannevar Bush had 
already proposed a system which had the aim to amplify 
people’s own knowledge and understanding (Bush, 1945). It was 
only five years later when the now celebrated Alan Turing wrote 
a paper centred around the idea of machines being able to 
simulate human beings and to carry out intelligent tasks, such as 
the playing of chess (Turing, 1950). As such, the idea of a 
machine which could encapsulate some sort of conception of 
intelligence can already find its space in that years.  
3b. Current Approaches 
Nowadays, there are two main views held in regard to 
algorithms. These two shape the different directions taken by 
approaches to AI. One is held by the proponents of strong AI and 
one by the ones of weak AI. The ones defending the former argue 
that an algorithm is a universal concept which is applicable to 
anything that works mechanically and thus, also the brain. They 
argue that human intelligence works through algorithmic 
processes just like computers. However, as the algorithmic 
processes regulating the brain are highly sophisticated, they do 
contend that there does not yet exist any man-made system 
comparable to it. Yet, it is only a matter of time. On the contrary, 
proponents of weak AI maintain that even though aspects of 
human thinking are algorithmic, there are critical aspects about 
the way humans are given to experience the world which do not 
fit the algorithmic picture and probably never will. Humans 
experience the world from sensations. These two characteristic 
approaches to AI also shape any groundwork on AGI. Hence, 
they ought to be kept in mind throughout the Thesis to better 
grasp the subject matter.   
3c. Projects  
Apart from these two main approaches, there are several projects 
which have been attempted through the years and which are 
important to present in order to better understand the nature of 
the concerns and points advanced in the literature review. Two 
projects will hereby be presented. It is important to state that 
they differ in approach. These two projects are the CYC project 
and the SOAR project.  
 In the mid 80s, the CYC project began as an attempt to 
encode common-sense knowledge in first-order predicate logic 
(Goertzel, 2007). The encoding process was a large effort and it 
produced a useful knowledge database and a specialised and 
complex inference engine3. However, until today CYC does not 
‘solve problems whose solution was not presented to them at the 
stage of their creation’ (see AGI definition). Plainly, it does not 
come up with its own solutions; which is a defining feature of 
AGIs. CYC researchers have encoded in the system common-
sense knowledge. However, this knowledge-filled database has 
resulted in an open-ended collection of data more than dynamic 
knowledge. By making use of declarative language by means of 
Lisp syntax4, CYC features the ability to deduce concepts. 
However, differently from neural networks techniques, it still 
relies on humans inputting an ‘unending’ amount of data before 
outputting any result.  This is one of the main critiques adduced 
to the CYC case. CYC enthusiasts have rushed in its defence by 
stating that CYC has the potential to be imported in future AI 
projects (Goertzel, 2007). 
 Adopting an opposite approach, Allen Newell’s SOAR 
project is a problem-solving tool which is based on logic-style 
knowledge representation and mental activity figured as 
‘problem solving’ expressed by a series of heuristics (Goertzel, 
2007). The core of the effort behind the SOAR project is to 
investigate the architecture which underlies intelligent behaviour 
(Rosenbloom, Laird & Newell., 1993) and what constitutes 
intelligent action rather than knowledge. SOAR can be described 
as a sequence of three cognitive levels; the memory level, the 
decision level and the goal level. These are merely descriptive 
terms which are used to refer to the mechanism constitutive of 
the SOAR architecture (Rosenbloom, Laird & Newell, 1991).  
Even though it represents a great step in the AGI field, up until 
now the system is still a disembodied problem-solving tool 
                                                 
3 More insights can be found on the site: www.cyc.com 
4 Lisp is the second-oldest high-level programming language 
favoured for research in Artificial Intelligence. It allows to 
interchangeably manipulate source codes as a data structure. His 
command line is called a Read-Eval-Print-Loop as it reads the 
entered expression, evaluates them and prints the result 
(Chisnall, 2011). 
lacking the autonomy and self-understanding which are expected 
in an AGI.  
4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Notwithstanding the various pursuits for AGI implementation, 
the discipline was propelled chiefly from an idea. The present 
section will focus on the intellectual life and discourse 
surrounding AGI. This section lays the groundwork for the 
future analysis.  
4a. Different Worlds 
Through the following paragraphs, it is more specifically 
presented how, through the years, the expectations and what are 
considered the key factors on the way to AGI have differently 
developed on the side of the Humanities and on the side of the 
Sciences. The following paragraphs ought to elucidate this 
claim. Even though with a risk of redundancy, it is important to 
state that all the scholars and great minds presented in the 
paragraph ‘The Stance of the Science World’ come mostly from 
a scientific background, while the ones in ‘The Stance of the 
Humanities’ come mostly from a philosophy background. Some 
of them have also expertise in both fields. In that case, they are 
found in the section for which their background is stronger. The 
following paragraphs provide the content which will be subject 
to the application of the Theoretical Framework later in the 
paper. 
4b. The Stance of the Science World 
Influenced by the groundwork of Alan Turing, the 70s featured 
the creation of Putnam’s ‘mentalist project’ (Dreyfus & 
Haugeland, 1974). The mentalist project was an endeavour to 
represent the rules that govern human behaviour and the mind by 
a Turing machine table that relates input and output states. 
Concurrently, the scientists Newell, Shaw and Simon who were 
in the 1950s considered the pioneers of Cognitive Simulation, 
announced that ‘within ten years most theories in psychology 
will take the form of computer programs’ (Simon & Newell, 
1957, p.8). George Miller himself, a distinguished psychologist 
at Harvard, asserted that the current developments in the study of 
man’s understanding could be viewed as a system of information 
processing (Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960, p.57). The 
configuration of mental processes as computations was taken 
beyond a mere analogy.  
 A more critical stance towards the ability of re-
creating certain mind-phenomena such as consciousness through 
algorithms is provided by the scientist Roger Penrose in his 
book, ‘The Emperor’s new Mind’ (1989). On one hand, he 
claims that the mind understood as ‘consciousness’ cannot be 
computed. However, he contends that this is impossible only as 
long as the model is based on the idea of a Turing Machine, as 
the latter only mimics mental processes and does not progress 
towards any kind of ‘understanding’ for the machine. Even 
though rejecting the Turing Machine’s paradigm, as many other 
scientists he strongly defends that more generally mental activity 
is ‘the carrying out of some well-defined series of operations’ 
(Penrose, 1989, p.17). He resorts to call these operations 
‘algorithms’. Penrose does convene that mental activity can be 
represented through algorithms. Additionally, he stresses that 
human mental processes result in our ability to ‘understand’ and 
that is what research ought to focus on. AGIs can improve their 
performance by experience through a sort of ‘feedback system’ 
for performance improvement. According to Penrose, this might 
account for some kind of ‘understanding’.  
 Another scientist who widely confronted the 
assumptions underlying AGI implementation is Murray 
Shanahan5. Interestingly, as also Penrose proposed, he figures 
the main challenge on the road to AGI as a matter of endowing a 
system with ‘common sense understanding’. Howbeit, Shanahan 
considers ‘common sense understanding’ to need to blend with 
creativity. He calls both these elements ‘cognitive ingredients’ 
and while describing AGI, he locates it in what he calls ‘the 
space of possible minds’ (Shanahan, 2016). Thus, he adopts a 
mind-stance. In the space of possible minds, AGI can figure 
either by means of ‘whole brain emulation’6  or by constructing 
an artificial brain which matches a statistical description of a 
new-born’s central nervous system. Even when Shanahan admits 
that the human brain is not necessarily the starting point on the 
path to AGI, he proposes different architectures such as brute 
force search algorithms and machine learning techniques which 
approach the problem on terms of computation (Shanahan, 
2016). Indeed, he convenes that ‘human thinking’ can be instated 
through computation, whether they resemble the brain or not.  
4c. The Stance of the Humanities 
On the side of the humanities, the philosopher Hubert Dreyfus 
claims that AGI is based on a boastful epistemological 
assumption. This assumption implies that all knowledge is 
formalizable. Plainly, humans’ thoughts and actions have 
produced a body of knowledge on which human reality feeds 
itself and stands on. Howbeit, AGI assumes that this body of 
knowledge can be expressed in context-independent formal 
definitions and rules (Brey, 2001, p.5). He asserts that while 
these formal rules can successfully describe human knowledge, 
they cannot be used to reproduce it. In fact, the application of 
these rules is actually context-dependent. Hence, he contends 
that there is a body of knowledge - constitutive of human reality 
- which ought to be acknowledged in AGI implementation. 
However, at the same time he stresses that this knowledge is too 
dependent on circumstances and on context to be successfully 
objectively formalized; this is where the main challenge lies.  
                                                 
5 It is important to state that, even though Murray Shanahan is an 
expert in Cognitive Robotics, he also engaged in several 
philosophical work. 
6 The process of copying the brain of an individual, scanning its 
structure in nanoscopic detail, replicating its physical behaviour 
in an artificial substrate, and embodying the result in a humanoid 
form (aeon). 
 
Another philosopher who adds a valuable contribution 
to the topic is John Searle. Dreyfus and Searle agree on the fact 
that (Strong) AI relies on another mistaken assumption. Strong 
AI figures intelligent systems as symbol processing systems 
(Brey, 2001, p.4; Searle, 1990, p.26). According to this view, 
thinking merely consists in symbol manipulation rather than 
meaning and human knowledge. Additionally, such an 
assumption furthers the idea that the mind stands to the brain as 
a program stands to the hardware. Searle however, strongly 
refutes this view. He claims that minds are not programs. In fact, 
programs are formal, syntactic and thus, they are sufficiently 
defined in terms of symbol manipulation. For example, a line of 
program can be ‘if 01, then print 1’. In this case, a program does 
not need to understand or have knowledge of what ‘01’ means in 
order to execute ‘print 1’ and to move from symbol ‘01’ to 
symbol ‘1’. Differently, human minds have mental contents 
(Searle, 1990) and the linguistic understanding which happens 
between people who intend to share mental contents requires a 
semantic framework as provided by the net of human 
knowledge. This is what enables the conveying of meaning. As it 
is presently defined, strong AI appears to overlook this 
difference which is instead crucial when dealing with ‘general 
intelligence’. 
5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section presents the theoretical framework which provides 
the lens through which the literature will subsequently be 
analysed.  
5a. Core argument: ‘Popper’s 3 worlds’ 
Karl Raimund Popper was born in Vienna in 1902. He is one of 
the most prominent philosophers of Science. Karl Popper is 
more commonly associated with Critical Rationalism and his 
most acclaimed work is about Falsificationism and the evolution 
of objective knowledge in scientific inquiry. A special focus will 
hereby be dedicated to his pluralist view on reality. 
Popper advocates a pluralist view of human reality. 
According to him, there exist three ‘Worlds’ or ‘sub-universes’ 
(Popper, 1979). World 1 consists of physical bodies. Plainly, 
elements of it are physical living and non-living objects such as 
stars, stones, animals and plants. World 2 is the world of 
conscious experience. It is the mental and psychological world 
filled with subjective experiences, mental states like pain and 
pleasure, perceptions and intentions. It is what humans think 
about the world as they try to map, represent, hypothesize or 
anticipate in order to maintain their existence in an ever-
changing place. Finally, world 3 is the world of the products of 
the human mind. This broadly includes languages, songs, 
paintings, mathematical constructions, theories and even culture.  
Popper strongly advocates not only the existence of the 
products of the human mind, but also their being real rather than 
fictitious. As far as these have a causal effect upon us, they 
ought to be real. Products of the human mind, for example 
scientific theories, have proven to have an impact on the physical 
world by changing the way humans build things and utilize 
them. Popper believes that the causal impact of world 3 is more 
effective than scissors and screwdrivers (Popper, 1979). 
Furthermore, even though elements of World 3 are generally 
instantiated in a concrete object of World 1 – books, physical 
components of a computer… -, it is not a necessary condition 
that they be so expressed (Sloman, 1985). 
 
Figure 1. Popper’s Three Worlds visualization 
This simple above visualization suggests Popper’s 
acknowledgement of the interaction between the three worlds. 
According to Popper, World 3 theories or plans always ought to 
be primarily understood by a mind in World 2 before they be 
operationalized. Withal, the theory itself and its 
operationalization have effects on World 1 physical objects. An 
example can be purported by Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. 
The scientific community had to first subjectively grasp the 
content of the Theory of Relativity before this could be applied 
to change the physical reality. Hence, World 2 proves itself to be 
a necessary intermediary between World 3 and World 1. 
Likewise, as Einstein’s special Theory of Relativity lead to the 
creation of the atomic bomb, World 3 impacts World 1.  
Finally, both for the specific purpose of this research 
and to follow Popper’s emphatic concern for this distinction, we 
ought to precisely differentiate between ‘thought processes’ and 
‘thought contents’. The former belong to World 2 while the latter 
to World 3 (Popper, 1979). Even though these two might appear 
to be interchangeable, they are fundamentally and foundationally 
different. It is paramount to understand that the process of 
thinking is unlike the knowledge which this process itself 
unveils. This distinction ought to be sheltered in the reader’s 
mind as it gains momentum in the following paragraphs.  
6 DISCUSSION  
6a. Popper’s Three Worlds 
Programmatic processes – ex. Algorithms - and the data which 
they output and process act in interplay. For example, intelligent 
systems’ internal algorithms are designed to deal with the data 
they are inputted with and the way they process these data 
consequently modifies the output. These processes – such as 
algorithms – and data – such as big packages of information –
both ought to exist and co-exist in an AGI system and they have 
an impact the one on the other. While several algorithms in AGI 
aspire to imitate thought processes, the knowledge or data which 
they process and output can be thought of as the content which is 
the product of these processes. As Karl Popper stressed, thought 
processes – related to mental events and states - and thought 
contents – related to objective contents of thoughts – belong 
respectively to two different ‘worlds’ and hence, they are 
foundationally and fundamentally different (Popper, 1978). 
Indeed, the process of thinking is unlike the knowledge which 
this process itself unveils. Both concepts seem to unilaterally 
figure in the understanding and explanations of AGI, depending 
on from which field – Science or Humanities – the claim 
originates. Now, do they? 
Both Penrose and Murray Shanahan build the 
foundations of their work on AGI on the conviction that the 
mind can be computed and specifically Penrose refers to AGI as 
a matter of ‘mental processes’ which manipulate information. On 
the other hand, philosophers such as Dreyfus claim that AGI 
systems ought to be deeply characterized by the character of the 
information which they manipulate and thus, they stress the role 
of World 3 thought contents. Popper’s pluralist view helps to 
shed light on this subtle and yet fundamental distinction which 
appears to delimitate mainly the views of researchers in 
Philosophy and Scientists on the topic of AGI.  
Arguably, if we read the topic of AGI under a World 2 
lens, both subjective experience and mental tasks are key words 
(Popper, 1983). As per subjective experience, in the section 
‘Experience as Method’ Popper addresses subjective empirical 
experience as the structured, logical description of only one 
world – the ‘world of our experience’ (Popper, 1983) - out of an 
infinite number of logically possible worlds. In the AGI case and 
for computers, the expression of their only ‘world of experience’ 
happens through binary logic and their ‘mental tasks’ are carried 
out through algorithms. Computer scientists and AI researchers 
adopt binary logic as their main tool and psychologists and 
neuroscientists primarily study mental tasks and subjective 
experience. Could this favour a reading of AI from a World 2 
perspective?  
On the other hand, in ‘Epistemology without a 
knowing subject’, Popper considers World 3’s objective 
knowledge such as theories and ideas as something which does 
not need a knowing subject; as an entity independent of 
anybody’s disposition or belief towards knowledge (Popper, 
1972). Once we apply this to the context of AGI, Dreyfus would 
agree in the sense that we, as humans, rely on a body of 
knowledge that we have produced. That knowledge can be used 
to describe human behaviour.  He claims that there is a body of 
knowledge that ought to be recognized in the implementation of 
AGI. Nevertheless, this last of Popper’s formulations dissents 
with Dreyfus acknowledgement of the importance of context in 
matters of human knowledge. Indeed, Dreyfus contends that 
human knowledge is highly dependent of context and 
circumstances and henceforth, not independent of a subject. 
Searle would also recognize the importance of a net of human 
knowledge from which to derive meaning. Nevertheless, he 
would also disagree in the sense that for him this knowledge is 
highly dependent of people’s dispositions towards it. Thus, even 
though both philosophers would stress the importance of 
‘knowledge’, Popper’s world 3 does not exhaust what is 
important in their views.  
6b. In the real World 
The attempt to interpret the AGI discourse by means of the 
tension between World 2 and World 3, might advance a 
hypothesis on a possible reason why projects such as CYC and 
SOAR have not resulted to be successful (from section ‘Projects 
and Possible Solutions’). On one hand, the CYC was started with 
the aim to encode all common knowledge. However, as it is a 
knowledge-filled database, it has resulted in the accumulation of 
data. On the other hand, the SOAR project was started with the 
aim to instantiate mental activity. However, as it reproduces 
‘intelligent action’ by algorithms rather than knowledge, it has 
resulted in a disembodied problem-solving tool. It is clear how 
‘General Intelligence’ cannot be reached unilaterally. While the 
endeavours of the CYC project might be better represented by 
World 3, SOAR’s endeavours might be better represented by 
World 2. It ought to be acknowledged that in reality these two 
Worlds interact. Thus, it might be fruitful to think about a 
General Intelligent machine as something which can integrate 
both though processes and thought contents, the content of a 
theory and the processing of it.  
7 LIMITATIONS  
One of Popper’s admirable recommendations is that one ought to 
expose potential weaknesses of one’s theories (Popper, 1983). 
As per this thesis, there are several factors which ought to be 
taken into consideration while reading it and of which the reader 
should be made aware of. The first point concerns the 
Theoretical Framework. Indeed, the backbone of the argument 
which derives its structure from Popper’s Three Worlds cannot 
be said to uniformly apply to every case of the AGI discourse or 
research. While the framework has proven to be arguably sound 
for some limited cases in Science and Humanities, the panorama 
can supposably vary for interdisciplinary cases. Some 
mathematicians are also trained philosophers and vice-versa. 
Further research could venture in examining such cases.  
Moreover, the distinction which Popper meant to draw 
between the Worlds appears to be an ontological one. In his 
‘Objective Knowledge’ he presents the idea of three different 
ontological worlds (1972). Furthermore, in his ‘Knowledge 
without a knowing Subject’ (1972) and in his ‘Three Worlds’ 
(1979) he repeatedly stresses the existence of World 3 
independently on a subject perceiving it and it justifies its 
existence by means of the causal impact it has on other Worlds. 
Given these considerations, it ought to be stressed that this 
Thesis utilizes Popper’s distinction to try to group different 
readings or different standpoints on the matter of AGI. 
However, it does not claim any ontological difference between 
the three Worlds.   
8 CONCLUSION 
The present Thesis has traversed the topic of AGI by first 
providing a brief account of its history, different approaches and 
projects. A more in-depth prospect on the matter has been 
presented by the Literature Review. The Theoretical Framework 
has served as a toolbox to analyse the AGI discourse from 
famous academics and scholars. At the very incipit the question 
was, ‘How can Popper’s Three-worlds paradigm be applied to 
frame the opinions of scientists and philosophers on Artificial 
General Intelligence (AGI) and what does it reveal about the 
way the topic of AGI is approached?’. By the end of this Thesis, 
it can be argued that World 2 and World 3 can be utilized in 
framing and grouping the opinions of the two disciplines on the 
topic of AGI. More broadly, this can be framed in terms of 
approaching the topic by means of thought processes (World 2) 
and thought contents (World 3). This analysis can hypothesize 
discrepancies between the two ‘worlds’ of Philosophy and 
Science, when they tend to more strongly approach AGI from 
just one of the stances. Even though each stance provides a ‘safe 
place’ for each field, on one hand it is difficult to rely on World 
3’s objective knowledge and theories without taking into 
consideration the mental processes which output this knowledge. 
On the other, it is difficult to claim that ‘understanding’ 
automatically arises from World 2’s mental processes by 
overlooking World 3.  
In conclusion, what could we learn or advance from 
this analysis? Overall, the possible suggestions are innumerable 
but I believe that the incentivizing of interdisciplinarity can 
favour the opening of worldviews, communication between and 
within fields and finally, place the AGI discourse in Popper’s 
World 3 where, either as a theory or as a mere human idea, it can 
be subject to critique. I contend that an interdisciplinary 
approach ought to be more cherished as it promises more 
realistically nuanced outcomes than trying to figure out and 
picture every possible future AGI scenario from each discipline. 
Furthermore, it can integrate the different stances from each 
field, transforming an obstacle into an asset. Researchers, 
professors but also students ought to be acquainted through their 
path of study with what other fields have to say and with their 
now still ‘alien’ worldviews. The ways to push interdisciplinarity 
on the agenda are innumerable, from curricula in schools and 
universities to open conferences, journals and more accessible 
popular events. As it is, AGI is an interdisciplinary matter in 
itself and it has the potential to lure people towards its topic from 
several angles. This would also avoid the spreading of fear 
towards the future of AI and AGI, a fear which many a times 
derives from miscommunication and misunderstanding. We 
should better concentrate together on what is possible rather than 
on what might happen.  
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